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Oregon has consistently been a leader in the nationwide fight 
against the depletion of natural resources and urban sprawl.1 
Throughout the 1970s, the Oregon legislature, with the help of state 
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1 See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, 
PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 222–223 (1999). 
BLODGETT 7/20/2011  11:49 AM 
260 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 26, 259 
agencies, implemented a revolutionary statewide growth management 
system “on a scale not witnessed in any other American state.”2 This 
system aimed to preserve rural forest and agricultural lands by 
containing development within designated urban growth boundaries 
and encouraging sustainable land use planning.3 The Oregon 
legislature was motivated by its specific goals for the state, including 
a desire to help “communities achieve sustainable development 
patterns and manage the effects of climate change.”4 
However, Oregon’s ground-breaking approach to land use came to 
a screeching halt when voters passed Ballot Measure 37, an initiative 
that entitled property owners burdened by state land use regulations to 
full compensation for diminished property values.5 In lieu of 
compensation, Measure 37 permitted government entities to modify, 
remove, or waive the application of land use regulations.6 The 
passage of Measure 37 was the culmination of a decade-long 
resistance to Oregon’s land use “overregulation,” an effort 
spearheaded by groups that had relentlessly advocated for private 
property rights within the state.7 
Despite the activists’ triumph, Measure 37 was extremely difficult 
to implement. At the outset, there was continual uncertainty over 
whether Measure 37 would survive the judicial and legislative 
process.8 The constitutionality of the Measure was quickly challenged 
in court9 and the Measure faced major threats of reform from the 
legislature.10 Moreover, the language of Measure 37 was both 
ambiguous and brief, leaving many unanswered questions regarding 
the scope of the rights protected by the Measure and the 
 
2 Michael C. Blumm & Erik Grafe, Enacting Libertarian Property: Oregon’s Measure 
37 and Its Implications, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 279, 281 (2007). 
3 Id. 
4 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010(2)(b) (2010). 
5 See Measure 37 (2004) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 (2007)), 
available at http://www.oregonvotes.org/pages/history/archive/nov22004/guide/meas/m37 
_text.html; DLCD Measure 37, OREGON.GOV (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.oregon.gov 
/LCD/MEASURE37/legal_information.shtml#Information_About_the_Election (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2011). 
6 Measure 37, §§ 8, 10 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305(8), (10) 
(2007)). 
7 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 282. 
8 Alex Potapov, Making Regulatory Takings Reform Work: The Lessons of Oregon’s 
Measure 37, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,516, 10,526–29 (2009). 
9 Id. at 10,526–27 (discussing MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 340 Or. 117 
(2006)). 
10 Id. at 10,527–28. 
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implementation of the compensation requirement.11 In response, 
government actors were repeatedly hostile towards the new scheme, 
making it even more challenging to execute.12 
After three years of legal and political struggle, Oregonians 
recognized the massive implications of Ballot Measure 37 and 
responded by passing Ballot Measure 49.13 Measure 49 dramatically 
scaled back and clarified the development rights shaped by Measure 
37.14 Despite this improvement, Measure 49 left many legal issues 
unresolved.15 One of the most critical questions remaining was 
whether Measure 49 invalidated preexisting land use regulation 
waivers awarded to Measure 37 claimants. According to Judge Owen 
M. Panner of the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon, Measure 49 had no effect on these regulatory waivers 
because he interpreted them to be binding, constitutionally protected 
contracts.16 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals quickly 
reversed Judge Panner’s decision and concluded that the Measure 37 
waivers did not actually produce a contract between the state and 
landowner claimants.17 
This Article examines Oregon’s lengthy struggle to achieve a 
balanced land use system and discusses the potential of the reserved 
powers doctrine as a tool for retroactively limiting the scope of 
Measure 37 waivers, along with other regulatory waivers that could 
arise under similar initiatives proposed and adopted across the United 
States.18 The reserved powers doctrine—a time-honored exception to 
 
11 Id. at 10,529–34. 
12 Id. at 10,535. 
13 Rob Manning, Measure 49 Just Another Bend in a Long Land Use Road, OR. PUB. 
BROADCASTING NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007), http://news.opb.org/article/measure-49-just 
-another-bend-long-land-use-road (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). 
14 Compare Measure 49 (2007) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 
(2007)), available at http://www.oregonvotes.org/pages/history/archive/nov62007/guide 
/m49_text.html, with Measure 37 (2004) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 
195.305 (2007)), available at http://www.oregonvotes.org/pages/history/archive/nov22004 
/guide/meas/m37_text.html. 
15 David J. Boulanger, The Battle Over Property Rights in Oregon: Measure 37 and 49 
and the Need for Sustainable Land Use Planning, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 313, 328 (2008). 
16 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson Cnty., 2008 WL 4890585, at *2–5 (D. 
Or. Nov. 12, 2008), rev’d, 388 F.App’x 710 (2010). 
17 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson Cnty., 388 F.App’x 710 (9th Cir. July 
20, 2010). 
18 Property rights activists across the nation are continually trying to force governments 
to provide compensation for burdensome land use regulations. To date, there are six states  
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the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution—provides courts with 
authority to interpret contracts entered into by a state as revocable if 
they interfere with essential attributes of sovereign power, such as the 
right to enact regulations that safeguard the public’s welfare.19 
Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that Measure 37 waivers are 
not contracts, precluding the need to apply the reserved powers 
doctrine to protect Oregon’s rural landscape, the doctrine could have 
strengthened the court’s conclusion, and would be useful to courts 
facing similar dilemmas in the future. 
Part I provides a brief introduction to Oregon’s expansive land use 
system. Part II then discusses the revolt against Oregon’s system that 
resulted from the state’s approach to private land use regulation. One 
way that voters expressed their frustration towards state land use 
regulations was by passing Measure 37. However, the public quickly 
realized the massive ramifications associated with Measure 37 and 
passed Measure 49. Part III explores both Citizens for Constitutional 
Fairness v. Jackson County decisions, introduces the Contract Clause 
of the United States Constitution, and describes how the district and 
appellate courts applied the Contract Clause to formulate their 
conclusions. Citizens I concluded that the land use regulation waivers 
granted pursuant to Measure 37 were binding, irrevocable contracts 
that could not be subsequently altered by Measure 49, while Citizens 
II interpreted these waivers to be fully revocable. Finally, Part IV 
discusses the reserved powers doctrine as alternative grounds for 
limiting the scope of Measure 37 and similar state initiatives across 
the country. The reserved powers doctrine, a common law tool crafted 
 
that have adopted “takings compensation laws,” including Florida (1995), Louisiana 
(1995), Mississippi (1995), Texas (1995), Oregon (2004), and Arizona (2006). John D. 
Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons 
from Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 442–44, 516, 518 (2009). 
There are also plenty of initiatives that have been unsuccessful. In 2006 alone, property 
rights activists unsuccessfully attempted to place similar initiates on ballots in six states, 
including Montana, Missouri, California, Washington, Idaho, and Oklahoma. Americans 
for Limited Government, BALLOTPEDIA (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.ballotpedia.org/wiki 
/index.php/Americans_for_Limited_Government; Dan Whipple, Property-Rights 
Initiatives Threaten Environmental Protections in Four Western States, GRIST (Oct. 16, 
2006), http://www.grist.org/article/whipple. Even though some of these initiatives do not 
directly permit government officials to waive applicable land use laws, most would 
interpret them to do so to avoid paying an insurmountable amount of money to burdened 
property owners. See generally Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra. 
19 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996); U.S. Tr. Co. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (“The States must possess broad power to adopt general 
regulatory measures without being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or 
even destroyed, as a result.”). 
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by the Supreme Court of the United States to protect a state’s ability 
to enact legislation necessary to preserve the public welfare, allows a 
state to modify or rescind existing contracts that interfere with its 
ability to exercise essential sovereign responsibilities.20 Since 
enacting legislation that ensures proper land use is an essential state 
responsibility, the reserved powers doctrine is a powerful, yet 
unexplored, method for protecting important state land use 
regulations—and ultimately, the public interest. 
I 
BACKGROUND: OREGON’S LAND USE SYSTEM 
Oregon has been a leader in the field of land use planning for 
decades.21 The foundation of Oregon’s comprehensive, statewide land 
use planning system was laid in 1973, when the Oregon legislature 
passed the landmark Senate Bill 100.22 Senate Bill 100 was the 
legislature’s response to Governor Tom McCall’s powerful speech 
condemning “sagebrush subdivisions, coastal condomania, and the 
ravenous rampages of suburbia” and his request for legislation to 
establish a statewide program for land use planning.23 To ensure 
effective administration of the state’s new land use system, Senate Bill 
100 created an agency to coordinate land use planning—the 
Department of Land Conservation and Development—to be directed by 
the Land Conservation and Development Commission.24 In 1979, the 
Oregon legislature strengthened its land use system even further by 
creating the Land Use Board of Appeals, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction to review all legislative and quasi-judicial land use 
decisions in the state.25 
One of the most notable effects of Senate Bill 100 was that it gave 
the newly formed Land Conservation and Development Commission 
 
20 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 755 (2010). 
21 See Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., History of Oregon’s Land Use 
Planning, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/history.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 
2011). 
22 See S.B. 100, 1973 Leg., 57th Reg. Sess., 1973 Or. Laws 80 (Or. 1973) (codified as 
amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197 (2005)), available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs 
/bills/sb100.pdf. 
23 Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., supra note 21. 
24 S.B. 100, § 5. 
25 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.805–197.860; Land Use Bd. of Appeals, Welcome to the 
Land Use Board of Appeals, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/LUBA/index.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2011). 
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authority to develop statewide planning goals and to ensure 
compliance with these goals.26 These goals express Oregon’s broad 
land use policies and are achieved through local comprehensive 
planning.27 The Commission ultimately developed nineteen goals that 
fit into in four broad categories, goals that address (1) the planning 
process, (2) conservation, (3) development practices, and (4) coastal 
resources.28 
The goals that have had the largest impact on land use in Oregon 
are Goals 3, 4, and 14.29 Goal 3 requires that all agricultural lands 
within the state are preserved and maintained for farm use.30 This goal 
severely limits rural landowners’ ability to place dwellings on their 
properties and to use their properties for anything other than farming, 
since all local governments are required to zone agriculture land for 
exclusive farm use.31 Goal 4 is similarly restrictive because it compels 
local governments to inventory, designate, and zone forest lands for 
mainly forest use.32 Goal 14 supports Goals 3 and 4 by requiring local 
governments to designate urban growth boundaries that impose limits 
on all foreseeable urban development.33 The land located within urban 
growth boundaries may be developed for urban commercial and 
residential use, while the land outside of the boundaries must remain 
rural agriculture and forest lands.34 
 
 
26 S.B. 100, § 11. 
27 Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goals, OREGON.GOV (Nov. 24, 2010), 
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). 
28 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 290. For the full text of each goal, see Or. Dep’t of 
Land Conservation & Dev., supra note 27. 
29 See Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 291. 
30 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING 
GOALS & GUIDELINES: GOAL 3: AGRICULTURAL LANDS 1, available at http://www 
.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal3.pdf (codified as OR. ADMIN. R. § 660-015-0000(3) 
(1974)). 
31 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 292–93. 
32 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING 
GOALS & GUIDELINES: GOAL 4: FOREST LANDS 1, available at http://www.oregon.gov 
/LCD/docs/goals/goal4.pdf (codified as OR. ADMIN. R. § 660-015-0000(4) (1974)). 
33 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING 
GOALS & GUIDELINES: GOAL 14: URBANIZATION 1, available at http://www.oregon.gov 
/LCD/docs/goals/goal14.pdf (codified as OR. ADMIN. R. § 660-015-0000(14) (1974)); 
Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 291. 
34 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., supra note 33, at 3. 
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II 
VOTERS’ RESPONSE TO OREGON’S SYSTEM: 
MEASURE 37 AND MEASURE 49 
Oregon’s land use system was controversial from the beginning. 
Because the state legislature and the governor’s office continually 
supported Oregon’s approach to land use planning, most attacks on 
the planning system came from citizen initiatives.35 Interest groups 
attempted to overhaul Oregon’s system on three separate occasions 
within ten years of Senate Bill 100’s adoption.36 The attacks 
continued despite these failed attempts.37 The 1998 ballot contained 
two initiatives that aimed to curtail the effects of Senate Bill 100 and 
provide more public involvement in land use regulation,38 one of 
which successfully required government entities to provide notice to 
landowners of all proposed changes to land use regulations by mail.39 
The most extreme attack on Oregon’s land use system came from 
Ballot Measure 7,40 an initiative very similar to Measure 37 that 
passed by an unofficial margin of fifty-four percent in the 2000 
election.41 Measure 7 broadened the scope of the Oregon 
Constitution’s takings clause42 to require government entities to 
compensate landowners for any regulation adopted after the current 
landowner purchased the property that restricted that owner’s land use 
practices and reduced their property value.43 Unlike Measure 37, 
Measure 7 did not contain an express provision allowing government 
entities to waive a land use regulation in lieu of compensation.44 
However, multiple local governments adopted controversial 
ordinances on their own accord after the approval of Measure 7 that 
 
35 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 296. 
36 Id. at 296–97. 
37 Id. at 298. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (discussing Oregon Ballot Measure 56 (1998) (codified as amended at OR. REV. 
STAT. § 215.503 (1999)). 
40 Amends Oregon Constitution: Requires Payment to Landowner if Government 
Regulation Reduces Property Value (Measure 7) (2000), available at http://oregonvotes 
.org/nov72000/guide/mea/m7/m7.htm. 
41 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 302. 
42 The takings clause of the Oregon Constitution states, “Private property shall not be 
taken for public use, nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without just 
compensation.” OR. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
43 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 299. 
44 Id. at 300. 
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would allow them to waive offending land use regulations and avoid 
compensating claimants.45 
Measure 7 had a very brief lifespan. In League of Oregon Cities v. 
Oregon, a group of local governments, land use organizations, and 
individuals challenged the Measure’s constitutionality before it went 
into effect.46 Their claim rested on the assertion that Measure 7 
violated the “separate vote” provision of the Oregon Constitution, 
which requires voters to vote for each constitutional amendment 
individually.47 In 2000, the plaintiffs were awarded a preliminary 
injunction, which effectively froze the implementation of Measure 
7.48 Soon after, the Marion County Circuit Court sided with the 
plaintiffs, granting their motion for summary judgment and declaring 
Measure 7 to be invalid.49 The State appealed the decision to the 
Oregon Court of Appeals, which in turn certified the appeal to the 
Oregon Supreme Court.50 In 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld 
the Circuit Court’s invalidation of Measure 7, agreeing that it violated 
the Oregon Constitution’s separate vote requirement.51 Despite the 
failure of Measure 7, property rights activists attempted to end the 
lengthy battle against Oregon’s land use system in their favor once 
again with the campaign for Measure 37. 
A.  Measure 37 
In November 2004, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 37, a 
bold initiative that dramatically altered land development rights 
within the state.52 The referendum’s success was in part due to the 
proponents of Measure 37 putting Dorothy English’s face to the 
alleged harm caused by Oregon’s land use system.53 Ms. English, an 
elderly Oregon landowner who was unable to subdivide her twenty-
acre lot to house her children and grandchildren and fund her 
 
45 Id. at 301. 
46 See League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, 334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892 (2002). 
47 Id. at 663–64 (discussing OR CONST. art. XVII § 1 (“When two or more amendments 
shall be submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the same election, 
they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately.”)). 
48 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 303. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 League of Or. Cities, 334 Or. at 649, 676. 
52 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 279 (According to some scholars, Measure 37 is 
“the leading example of libertarian property in the world.”). 
53 See Potapov, supra note 8, at 10,516–17. 
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retirement, symbolized Oregonians’ general belief that the state land 
use planning system was overly restrictive.54 In addition to Ms. 
English’s story, Measure 37 advocates focused their campaign on 
discussions of fairness and simplicity, arguing that the government 
should pay for the land that it takes.55 The campaign in favor of 
Measure 37 was extremely successful—the Measure passed by a 
margin of sixty-one percent and was approved in all but one of 
Oregon’s thirty-six counties.56 
Despite the calculated nature of the Measure 37 campaign, the law 
itself is exceptionally broad. Measure 37 introduced a “pay or waive” 
scheme that requires government entities to provide “just 
compensation” to property owners whenever a land use regulation 
restricts the use of their properties, thereby lowering the fair market 
value.57 In lieu of paying compensation for land use restrictions, a 
government entity could choose to waive the regulation at issue and 
allow a property owner to freely develop land without regulation.58 
There were, however, exceptions. Five categories of land use 
regulations were statutorily exempt from Measure 37: Regulations 
that were enacted to address (1) common and historically recognized 
public nuisances, (2) public health and safety, (3) compliance with 
federal law, (4) pornography and nude dancing, and (5) regulations 
 
54 Id. at 10,516. The Measure 37 campaign highlighted many Oregon landowners 
“whose dreams of developing their land were allegedly thwarted by seemingly extreme or 
arbitrary government action.” Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 306. 
55 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 306. 
56 Id. at 304; see also OR. SEC’Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT OF VOTES 
STATE MEASURE NO. 37 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.oregonvotes.org/doc 
/history/nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf 
57 Subsection 1 states: 
If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regulation or enforces a land 
use regulation enacted prior to the effective date of this amendment that restricts 
the use of private real property or any interest therein and has the effect of 
reducing the fair market value of the property, or any interest therein, then the 
owner of the property shall be paid just compensation. 
Measure 37, § 1 (2004). 
58 Subsection 8 states: 
Notwithstanding any other state statute or the availability of funds . . . in lieu of 
payment of just compensation under this act, the governing body responsible for 
enacting the land use regulation may modify, remove, or not to apply the land 
use regulation or land use regulations to allow the owner to use the property for 
a use permitted at the time the owner acquired the property.  
Id. § (8). 
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enacted before a property owner or a family member of the owner 
acquired the land at issue.59 
The wide scope and brief language60 of Measure 37 led to many 
unanswered questions. First, the Measure’s compensation requirement 
does not describe which government entities have jurisdiction to 
provide compensation to landowners and how these entities should 
calculate diminished property values.61 The Measure’s waiver 
provision is equally ambiguous. The language of Measure 37 does not 
effectively describe which government entities have authority to 
waive land use laws, and it does not address whether the waivers 
belong solely to the claimant or run with the land.62 In response to 
these ambiguities, there were multiple judicial and legislative 
attempts to limit the scope of the Measure. One of the most notable 
cases was a group of landowners, farm bureaus, and nonprofit 
organizations’ unsuccessful attempt to challenge the state and federal 
constitutionality of Measure 37. 63 In addition, both houses of the 
Oregon legislature introduced bills in the 2005 session to clarify the 
scope of Measure 37, none of which were successful.64 
The seemingly limitless property rights granted by Measure 37 had 
a huge impact on the Oregon land use system. It abrogated the state’s 
power to regulate a vast amount of valuable natural resources. 
According to one Measure 37 impact study, the law effectively 
disabled “the tools used over the past four decades to prevent sprawl 
and preserve agricultural and forest land in Oregon.”65 During the 
three years that Measure 37 was in force, there were 6857 Measure 37 
claims, requesting a total of $19.8 billion in compensation.66 These 
 
59 Id. § (3)(A)–(E). 
60 Measure 37 consisted of 13 subsections and contained less than 1100 words. See id. 
61 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 320–23. 
62 Id. at 323–25; see also Potapov, supra note 8, at 10530–31. 
63 See MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 340 Or. 117 (2006). 
64 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 317–18 (discussing S.B. 1037, 73d Legis. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3246, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3247, 
73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3249, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2005); H.B. 3130, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3285, 73d Legis. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); and S.B. 406, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005)). 
65 Boulanger, supra note 15, at 324 (quoting SHEILA MARTIN & KATIE SHRIVER, THE 
INST. OF PORTLAND METRO. STUDIES, DOCUMENTING THE IMPACT OF MEASURE 37: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 4–5 (2006), available at http://www.pdx.edu/sites 
/www.pdx.edu.ims/files/media_assets/ims_M37brainerdreport.pdf). 
66 Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Summaries of Measure 37 Claims Filed in 
the State (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE49/summaries_of_m37 
_claims.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). 
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claims included several large requests from timber companies, and 
about a third of all the claims requested sprawling residential 
subdivisions—exactly the kind of land uses that the Oregon 
legislature intended to limit with Senate Bill 100.67 Moreover, eighty-
five percent of claims were filed in counties located in western 
Oregon,68 which houses some of the most valued agricultural and 
forest lands within the United States.69 The government entities that 
processed these claims almost universally chose to waive the 
offending land use laws in lieu of paying compensation to claimants, 
paving the way for a massive amount of development.70 
B.  Measure 49 
Three years after the enactment of Measure 37, Oregon voters 
realized the new law’s implications and passed Measure 49.71 This 
law was referred to voters by the 2007 legislature72 and ratified with a 
sixty-one percent margin in the 2007 election.73 Measure 49 modified 
Measure 37 by revising the language found in the original law and 
adding seven sections that addressed many of the unanswered 
questions left by Measure 37.74 However, despite these changes, 
Measure 49 retained the core principle of Measure 37 that entitles 
 
67 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 358–59. 
68 Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., supra note 66. 
69 See generally Or. Dep’t of Agric., State of Oregon Agriculture, OREGON.GOV, 
http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/pub_bd_rpt.shtml (last updated Dec. 28, 2010). 
70 Blumm & Grafe, supra note 2, at 359. 
71 “Oregonians quickly caught on to the fact that the measure was really a guise for 
developers to gain the ability to develop high-value farm and forestland to make a quick 
profit.” Boulanger, supra note 15, at 327. According to Measure 49 advocates, most of the 
Measure 37 claims were submitted by large developers who would have constructed more 
than 2700 housing subdivisions on previously protected farm and forest land if their claims 
were approved. Id. at 327–28. 
72 H.B. 3540, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us 
/07reg/measpdf/hb3500.dir/hb3540.intro.pdf. Oregon legislators decided to refer Measure 
49 to the voters, rather than just voting on the bill themselves, because there were not 
enough House Democrats willing to vote for an outright legislative modification of 
Measure 37. Potapov, supra note 8, at 10,528. 
73 OR. SEC’Y OF STATE, SPECIAL ELECTION ABSTRACT OF VOTES: STATE MEASURE 
NO. 49 (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.oregonvotes.org/doc/history/nov62007 
/results.pdf. 
74 See Measure 49 (2007). In upholding Measure 49 and explaining its effect, the 
Oregon Supreme Court stated that Measure 49 amended Measure 37 and “altered the 
claims and remedies available to landowners.” Corey v. Dep’t of Land Conservation & 
Dev., 344 Or. 457, 463, 184 P.3d 1109, 1112 (2008). 
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landowners to either just compensation or a regulatory waiver for 
property values diminished by land use regulations.75 
Measure 49 established two separate standards for evaluating 
claims filed before and after June 28, 2007.76 Landowners who filed 
their claims before June 28, 2007, are entitled to compensation in the 
form of residential development, depending on where their property is 
located.77 Claimants who own property located in whole or in part 
within an urban growth boundary are entitled to build up to ten single-
family dwellings.78 If the property owner has an approved or pending 
Measure 37 claim, the owner is only entitled to the number of 
dwellings approved or sought in the original claim.79 Also, the total 
fair market value of the home sites granted pursuant to Measure 49 
cannot exceed the loss of fair market value caused by the appropriate 
regulation.80 Finally, the property owner must show that residential 
use was the “highest and best use” for the property when the 
regulation was enacted81 and that the property is currently zoned for 
residential use.82 
By contrast, the number of home sites that claimants owning 
property outside of an urban growth boundary are entitled to depends 
on the characteristics of their land.83 If a claimant’s property is located 
on high-value farmland or forest land or in a groundwater-restricted 
area, the claimant, under the “express option,”84 is entitled to develop 
either the number of houses described in the original Measure 37 
claim or three dwellings, whichever is fewer.85 A claimant who 
already has three homes on such a property may be approved for one 
additional dwelling.86 
 
75 See Measure 49, § 4. 
76 This date was significant to the authors of Measure 49 because the 2007 regular 
session of the seventy-fourth Legislative Assembly adjourned on June 28, 2007. Id. § 5. 
77 See id. § 5(1)–(2). 
78 Id. § 9(1). 
79 Id. § 9(2)(a). 
80 Id. § 9(2)(c). 
81 Id. § 9(8). 
82 Id. § 9(5)(e). 
83 DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., MEASURE 49 GUIDE 1 (Mar. 7, 2008), 
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49_guide.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2011). 
84 For more information on this option, see id. at 4–6. 
85 Measure 49, § 6(2)(a)–(b) (2007). 
86 Id. § 6(2)(b), (3). 
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If a claimant’s property is not located on such restricted land, a 
claimant is entitled to four to ten home sites under the conditional 
option, as long as the original Measure 37 claim is for more than three 
dwellings.87 A landowner will only be entitled to the number of homes 
cited in that owner’s original Measure 37 claim.88 If there are existing 
homes on the landowner’s property, the claimant will be entitled to ten 
homes, including the existing dwellings.89 In addition, the number of 
approved home sites is limited by the loss in fair market value caused 
by the applicable regulations, similar to properties located within 
urban growth boundaries.90 There is a general cap on the amount of 
permissible home sites: Claimants are barred from obtaining more than 
twenty home site approvals, regardless of how many properties a 
person owns or how many claims a person has filed.91 Finally, all 
claimants must file a form with the Department of Land Conservation 
and Development that describes whether they will proceed under the 
express or conditional option.92 
Landowners who wish to file claims after June 28, 2007, may also 
be entitled to compensation. These claims must be based on land use 
regulations enacted after January 1, 2007, and must be filed within 
five years of the offending regulation’s enactment.93 Similar to the 
original Measure 37 requirements, Measure 49 requires government 
entities to provide either just compensation or waive the new land use 
regulations that restrict a claimant’s property use.94 However, unlike 
Measure 37, this portion of Measure 49 only provides relief when 
regulations limit either residential use, or farming or forestry 
practices.95 Also, claimants are only entitled to relief that allows 
residential development with a value equivalent to the value lost by 
the offending regulations.96 
If a property owner obtained a waiver under Measure 37, the owner 
can complete a development project if the land use complies with the 
 
87 Id. § 7(1); MEASURE 49 GUIDE, supra note 83, at 6–8. 
88 Measure 49, § 7(1). 
89 Id. § 7(2)(b). 
90 Id. § 7(2)(c). 
91 Id. § 11(5). 
92 Id. § 8(1), (3). 
93 Id. §§ 12(1)(c), 13(4). 
94 Id. § 12(5)(a)–(b). 
95 Id. § 12(1)(b). 
96 Id. § 12(2). 
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terms of the waiver and if the claimant has a vested right to complete 
and continue the use.97 A vested right is a development project that is 
already under construction and is inconsistent with a zoning 
ordinance. Such projects may be completed under the nonconforming 
use designation because the property owner took substantial steps 
towards developing that use prior to the enactment of the regulation.98 
Measure 49 clearly allows claimants who have fully completed a 
development permitted by their Measure 37 waiver to continue their 
lawful use.99 However, if a claimant has completed only part of a 
development, the claimant can only complete the project with a 
vested right under common law.100 
Oregon courts have consistently stated that vested right 
determinations are factual issues that will be decided on a case-by-
case basis.101 An owner must have at least “partially completed any 
‘use described in the waiver’” to obtain a common law vested right.102 
It is unclear how much development a property owner must have 
“partially” completed to have a vested Measure 37 claim.103 However, 
Oregon appellate courts have considered a number of factors to 
determine when a vested right exists in contexts outside of Measures 
37 and 49, including (1) the amount of money spent on developing a 
land use in relation to the total cost of establishing the use; (2) the 
type, location, and cost of the property use; and (3) whether the 
owner’s acts are beyond just mere preparation for development.104 
Depending on where a property is located, the local city, county, or 
circuit court would have authority to determine whether a land use is 
vested at common law.105 
 
97 Id. § 5(3). 
98 Clackamas Cnty. v. Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 197, 508 P.2d 190, 192 (1973) (“The 
allowance of nonconforming uses applies not only to those actually in existence but also to 
uses which are in various stages of development when the zoning ordinance is enacted.”). 
99 Measure 49, § 5(3). 
100 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. & OR. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BALLOT 
MEASURE 49 AND THE COMMON LAW OF VESTED RIGHTS 1 (Dec. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/m37vestedrightsguidance010108.pdf. 
101 Id. at 1–2 (citing Clackamas Cnty. v. Holmes, 265 Or. at 197). 
102 Corey v. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., 344 Or. 457, 466 (2008). 
103 Boulanger, supra note 15, at 333–34. 
104 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. & OR. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 100, at 2. 
105 OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV., MEASURE 49: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD 
/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49_faq.pdf. 
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III 
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Oregon successfully curbed many of the harmful implications of 
Ballot Measure 37 with the adoption of Ballot Measure 49. However, 
one major question remained: Did Measure 49 retroactively cancel or 
modify the regulatory waivers granted pursuant to Measure 37? The 
courts were divided. According to Judge Owen M. Panner’s decision 
in Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson County (Citizens I), 
these waivers were binding, constitutionally protected contracts that 
could not be altered by Measure 49.106 However, on July 20, 2010, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court in its Citizens 
for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson County (Citizens II) ruling and 
concluded that the Measure 37 waivers did not create a contract 
between the state and landowner claimants.107 The foundation of both 
decisions stems from the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.108 
A.  The Language and Scope of the Contract Clause 
The Contract Clause provides, “No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”109 In addition to prohibiting 
the impairment of contracts between private parties, the Contract 
Clause similarly prohibits a state from impairing its own contractual 
obligations with other parties.110 In the latter circumstance, a private 
party can state a federal cause of action pursuant to the Contract 
Clause by alleging that he or she has a contract with the state111 that 
the state, through its legislative authority, has impaired.112 In order for 
a claim to be successful, a plaintiff must show that (1) a state law 
substantially impairs a contractual relationship, (2) the state did not 
have a “significant and legitimate public purpose” for the regulation, 
 
106 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson Cnty., 2008 WL 4890585, at *3 (D. 
Or. Nov. 12, 2008). 
107 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson Cnty., 388 F.App’x 710, 711 (9th 
Cir. July 20, 2010). 
108 See id.; Citizens for Constitutional Fairness, 2008 WL 4890585, at *2–4. 
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
110 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); New 
Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 
(1810). 
111 See Mun. Investors Ass’n v. Birmingham, 316 U.S. 153, 157 (1942) (A contractual 
obligation “must exist before it can be impaired.”). 
112 City Ry. Co. v. Citizens’ St. R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 557, 563 (1897). 
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and (3) if such a public purpose exists, the law is not reasonable and 
appropriate for the intended purpose.113 
Despite the seemingly broad language of the Contract Clause, it 
has not been interpreted to bar the impairment of all contracts. Shortly 
after the Supreme Court established that the Contract Clause prohibits 
a state from impairing its own contractual obligations, the Court also 
recognized that this broad application of the Contract Clause could 
impede a state’s ability to enact measures that are necessary for a state 
to carry out its sovereign responsibilities.114 As the Supreme Court 
gradually limited the scope of the Contract Clause in a series of cases, 
it is now well settled law that the Contract Clause does not operate to 
destroy the police powers of the states.115 States enjoy broad authority 
to legislate pursuant to their police powers—they are free to act to 
promote the public welfare116 and protect the lives, health, morals, 
comfort, and safety of the public.117 As noted by the Supreme Court, 
“literalism in the construction of the contract clause . . . would make it 
destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its 
prerogative of self-protection.”118 
 
113 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 
(1983). 
114 Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of 
Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 121 (citing 
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 874 (1996)). 
115 U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (“The States must possess broad 
power to adopt general regulatory measures without being concerned that private contracts 
will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result.”). 
116 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 472 (1987) (“The 
Contracts Clause has not been read literally to obliterate valid exercises of the States’ 
police power to protect the public health and welfare.”); Minn. Ass’n of Health Care 
Facilities, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). 
117 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) (“It is the settled 
law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does 
not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of 
the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public . . . . This power, 
which, in its various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the 
sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general 
welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.” 
(quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905))). 
118 Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 240 (quoting W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 
292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934) (internal quotation omitted)). 
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B.  Citizens I and II: 
Applying the Contract Clause to Measure 37 Waivers 
In Citizens I, Judge Panner employed the Contract Clause of the 
United States Constitution to analyze whether Measure 49 had a 
retroactive effect on the land use regulation waivers granted to 
landowners pursuant to Measure 37.119 In this case, multiple property 
owners had obtained Measure 37 waivers from Jackson County.120 
The County agreed to disregard the zoning requirements imposed 
after the plaintiffs acquired their properties, which allowed them to 
build homes and commercial properties.121 The County later decided 
that it would not honor these waivers after Oregon voters passed 
Measure 49, because it construed Measure 49 to effectively nullify 
the waivers.122 In response, the property owners brought an action 
against Jackson County and Danny Jordan, the County’s chief 
administrative officer, in federal court.123 
Relying on the Contract Clause, the court controversially held that 
Jackson County may not use Measure 49 “as an excuse to avoid its 
obligations under plaintiffs’ Measure 37 waivers” because the waivers 
are “binding, constitutionally protected contracts between plaintiffs 
and Jackson County.”124 To arrive at this conclusion, the court first 
determined that the waivers created a contract between the parties 
because there was mutual consideration,125 as required by Oregon 
law.126 Since the waivers were valid contracts, Jackson County’s 
refusal to honor the waivers was “obviously” a substantial impairment 
of the contracts at issue.127 
 
119 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson Cnty., 2008 WL 4890585, at *2–4 
(D. Or. Nov. 12, 2008). 
120 Jackson County issued waivers to the claimants because the Board of County 
Commissioners determined that the County could not afford to provide monetary 
compensation. Id. at *1. 
121 Eric Mortenson, Federal Judge Puts the Brakes on His Own Measure 37 Land-Use 
Ruling, OREGONIAN, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment 
/index.ssf/2009/02/federal_judge_puts_the_brakes.html. 
122 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness, 2008 WL 4890585 at *2. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *2, *3. 
125 The court determined that the plaintiffs’ consideration was agreeing to drop their 
claims for monetary compensation and that the County’s consideration was its waiver of 
the otherwise applicable zoning regulations. Id. at *3. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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The court assumed that Oregon had a significant and legitimate 
public purpose for enacting Measure 49, without identifying the 
assumed purpose.128 Nevertheless, the court declared that Measure 49 
went beyond the state’s intended purpose because Jackson County’s 
interpretation of Measure 49 eliminated, rather than just modified, the 
plaintiffs’ contractual rights, which in turn violated the Contract 
Clause.129 Based on this analysis, the court concluded that “Measure 
49 does not apply to plaintiffs’ Measure 37 waivers.”130 The court 
made sure to note that its ruling did not give the plaintiffs free reign to 
develop their property: “Just as Jackson County must honor its 
obligations under the Measure 37 waivers . . . plaintiffs must comply 
with the conditions imposed by the waivers, which include applicable 
zoning restrictions.”131 
Judge Panner’s decision completely undercut the positive effects of 
Measure 49 on Oregon’s land use system. Under this ruling, the 
regulatory waivers obtained by property owners pursuant to Measure 
37—waivers that authorized development typically impermissible 
under Oregon land use laws—remained fully enforceable 
notwithstanding the adoption of Measure 49.132 This interpretation of 
the two initiatives would have drastically altered Oregon’s rural 
landscape, because Measure 37 authorized a level of development that 
had never been experienced by the state.133 In the three years that 
Measure 37 was in effect, Jackson County alone issued 571 waivers 
to landowners, allowing unrestrained development on 60,000 acres.134 
According to a study conducted by Washington County, the limits 
imposed by Measure 49 on all approved Measure 37 development 
claims resulted in a loss of more than eighty percent of residential 
homes that were otherwise permissible pursuant to Measure 37 
waivers.135 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. The court also held, in the alternative, that Measure 37 waivers are final quasi-
judicial orders. Id. at *4. According to Judge Panner, this holding bars Measure 49, a 
legislative act, from rescinding the quasi-judicial waivers without violating the separation 
of powers. Id. An analysis of this holding is outside the scope of this Article. 
131 Id. 
132 Mortenson, supra note 121. 
133 See Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., supra note 66. 
134 Damian Mann, Court Strikes Decision on Measure 37 Development Waivers, 
ASHLAND DAILY TIDINGS, July 21, 2010, http://www.dailytidings.com/apps/pbcs.dll 
/article?AID=/20100721/NEWS02/7210311. 
135 Boulanger, supra note 15, at 328. 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, prevented this 
upheaval of Oregon’s calculated land use system when it reversed 
Judge Panner’s decision on July 20, 2010, in Citizens II. In an 
unpublished two paragraph memorandum, the Ninth Circuit quickly 
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to assert a Contract Clause violation 
because the Measure 37 waivers by themselves are not contracts, nor 
do the waivers prove the existence of a contract between the state of 
Oregon and landowner claimants.136 The court reasoned that waivers 
are not contracts because they “do not show that there was any offer 
by Jackson County, acceptance by the property owners or 
consideration.”137 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the face of the 
waivers disavow any promise to property owners.138 
Due to the Ninth Circuit’s brief analysis, the full scope of Citizens 
II remains somewhat unclear. Citizens II does not address whether the 
plaintiffs have a common law vested right to complete and continue 
the property use described in their waivers. If the plaintiffs have 
vested rights, they may be entitled to continue development simply 
due to the existence of their vested rights, as opposed to the mere 
existence of their waivers.139 This outcome would result in more 
development in rural Oregon than intended by Measure 49 
proponents. Also, the vast majority of Measure 37 claimants have 
already accepted their development rights permitted under Measure 
49, potentially lessening the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.140 
IV 
THE RESERVED POWERS DOCTRINE: 
A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE IMPAIRMENT OF STATE CONTRACTS 
As discussed in Part III.A, it is well-settled law that the Contract 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not absolute. One way that the 
Supreme Court has expressed this principle is by developing the 
reserved powers doctrine, a common law tool that can be employed 
 
136 Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson Cnty., 2010 WL 2836106 at *1. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. All Measure 37 waivers issued in Jackson County contained a disclaimer stating, 
“Jackson County does not promise Claimant(s) that Claimant(s) will eventually be able to 
put the property to any particular use.” Id. 
139 See Measure 49 § 5(3) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 (2007)). 
140 Potapov, supra note 8, at 10525 (citing Edward Sullivan & Carrie Richter, 
Commentary: Straightening Out Measure 37, 49: A Bump in the Road for Oregon Land 
Use Planning, DAILY J. COM., Dec. 11, 2008). 
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by courts to invalidate harmful government contracts or to protect a 
state’s ability to enact legislation necessary to fulfill its essential 
sovereign responsibilities. Under the reserved powers doctrine, a state 
is forbidden from contracting away any of its essential sovereign 
powers.141 This doctrine makes state contractual obligations—even if 
unmistakably clear—nonbinding if the obligations hinder the future 
exercise of an essential sovereign power, such as the use of state 
police powers to pass legislation that protects the public interest.142 
Because these contractual obligations are nonbinding, a state can later 
repudiate its promise without violating the Contract Clause. 
Applying this principle, regulatory waivers granted to property 
owners pursuant to Measure 37 or any other “pay or waive” scheme 
can be modified by subsequent government actions, either through a 
citizen-led initiative such as Measure 49 or by traditional legislation. 
Even though the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that Measure 37 
waivers could be altered or revoked because they are not contracts, 
the court should have employed the reserved powers doctrine to 
strengthen its conclusions and provide precedent for other states 
seeking to protect the enforcement of land use regulations. If other 
courts are faced with cases similar to Citizens for Constitutional 
Fairness v. Jackson County and interpret the regulatory waivers at 
issue to be irrevocable contracts, these rulings would be extremely 
detrimental to states—and would effectively bar government entities 
from regulating land use practices. This is an impermissible 
interpretation of regulatory waivers. The ability to regulate land use is 
one of the many powers that states possess as sovereigns, and is a 
power essential to protecting the public welfare through suitable 
planned development.143 
 
141 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996); U.S. Tr. Co. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977). 
142 U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 23 (declaring that “the Contract Clause does not require a 
state to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty”). 
“[T]he reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is read into [state] contracts as 
a postulate of the legal order.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 
(1934). 
143 The adoption of planning and zoning laws is one way that states exercise their 
police power. 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 8 (2010). States inherently have the 
authority to “enact laws for the safety, health, morals, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or 
general welfare of the people.” Id. Although land use regulations operate locally, they 
derive from the police power of the state. Id. 
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A.  The Evolution of the Reserved Powers Doctrine 
The basic contours of the reserved powers doctrine were gradually 
developed by courts throughout the nineteenth century.144 As noted by 
Professor Wright, “during the decades preceding 1878 the state courts 
were repeatedly enunciating the principle that there were some 
subjects over which the regulatory or even the repealing power of the 
legislatures continued in effect, regardless of the previous grants by 
state or local authorities.”145 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
was the first court to use some form of the reserved powers language 
to explain its holding.146 In that case, the court sustained the state 
legislature’s repeal of a statute that granted an exemption from 
military service because of the strong public interest in favor of 
providing an army.147 Soon after, the Supreme Court of New York 
used the reserved powers language to justify upholding a city 
ordinance that forbade the use of certain lands for burial grounds, 
despite a prior conveyance of lands for that purpose.148 
The Supreme Court of the United States did not explicitly 
acknowledge the reserved powers doctrine until 1877.149 In Beer 
Company v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld a state law that 
prohibited the production and sale of alcohol, despite the law’s 
alleged interference with a charter previously granted to the Boston 
Beer Company.150 Although the Court upheld the law on other 
grounds, the Court announced the reserved powers doctrine by 
stating, “As the police power of a State extends to the protection of 
the lives, health, and property of her citizens, the maintenance of good 
order, and the preservation of the public morals, the legislature 
cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for these 
objects.”151 The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine three years 
 
144 See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 195–203 (1938). 
145 Id. at 197. 
146 Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 443, 446 (1815) (declaring “We are not prepared 
to say that any one set of legislators can control their successors . . . in a case of such vital 
importance to the Commonwealth”). 
147 Id. at 447. 
148 Corp. of Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 5 Cow. 538, 540 (N.Y. 
1826) (stating that the city did not have the power to enter into a contract “which should 
control or embarrass their legislative powers and duties”). 
149 See Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878). 
150 Id. at 29. 
151 Id. 
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later in Stone v. Mississippi, a case that provides the “classic 
example”152 of the reserved powers limitation on the Contract 
Clause.153 In this case, the Court unanimously sustained the state 
legislature’s revocation of a twenty-five-year charter for a lottery 
franchise.154 The Court justified the impairment of the corporation’s 
franchise agreement by explaining that lotteries are subject to 
regulation under a state’s police power because they affect public 
health and morals.155 
Subsequent to Stone v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court expanded the 
reserved powers doctrine by applying it to protect the future exercise of 
state police powers to promote other public interests, including public 
welfare.156 In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, the 
Supreme Court upheld the state legislature’s revocation of a grant of 
submerged state land to a railroad company on the basis of the reserved 
powers doctrine.157 The Court rejected the company’s argument that the 
revocation violated the Contract Clause “[b]ecause the reserved powers 
doctrine rendered the grant of submerged land nonbinding, a later 
session of the Illinois legislature could revoke it without violating the 
Contract Clause.”158 In forming its conclusion, the Court made clear 
that “[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which 
the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under 
them . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.”159 
In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court heavily relied on Newton v. 
Commissioners—a case in which the Court ruled that Ohio legislation 
relocating a county seat did not impair the contractual obligation of an 
earlier Ohio legislature because of the reserved powers doctrine—to 
justify extending the reserved powers doctrine to the Illinois 
 
152 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996). 
153 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880) (reasoning that “the legislature 
cannot bargain away the police power of a State”). 
154 Id. at 819. 
155 Id. at 818–19. 
156 See Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) (declaring that the 
Contract Clause does not prevent new “regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure 
the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community”). See also Ill. 
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892), and Newton v. Mahoning Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879). 
157 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 463–64. 
158 Grant, supra note 114, at 128. 
159 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453. 
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legislature’s grant of submerged land.160 The Illinois Central Court 
applied the reserved powers doctrine to justify the legislature’s 
revocation because to the protection of submerged lands is a matter of 
public welfare. To begin the Court’s reasoning, Justice Field 
explained the historical and continual importance of navigable waters 
to commerce.161 Because navigable waters and the lands underneath 
them are “subject[s] of public concern to the whole people of the 
State,”162 Justice Field concluded that inalienability “follows 
necessarily from the public character of the property.”163 
The Supreme Court has continued to apply the reserved powers 
doctrine in modern cases involving the Contract Clause, but these 
cases are rare.164 The reserved powers language used by the Court has 
not changed substantively.165 However, the Court has refined the 
language that it uses to express the doctrine by declaring that the 
doctrine prevents states from surrendering “essential attributes of 
sovereign power” so that the state “continues to possess authority to 
safeguard the vital interests of its people.”166 
Despite the trend towards applying the reserved powers doctrine to 
protect exercises of state police powers in various contexts, the 
Supreme Court has typically limited the application of the doctrine to 
 
160 Id. at 458–59. The Supreme Court interpreted Newton to hold that: 
[T]here could be no contract and no irrepealable law upon governmental 
subjects, observing that legislative acts concerning public interests are 
necessarily public laws; that every succeeding legislature possesses the same 
jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that the latter have the same power of 
repeal and modification which the former had of enactment,-neither more nor 
less; that all occupy in this respect a footing of perfect equality; that this is 
necessarily so, in the nature of things; that it is vital to the public welfare that 
each one should be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances 
and present exigencies attending the subject may require; and that a different 
result would be fraught with evil. 
Id. at 459. 
161 Id. at 458. 
162 Id. at 455. 
163 Id. at 456. The Court went on to state: 
The soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the state in trust for 
the common use and as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, any act of 
legislation concerning their use affects the public welfare. It is therefore 
appropriately within the exercise of the police power of the state. 
Id. at 459 (emphasis added). 
164 Grant, supra note 114, at 132. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 435 (1934)). 
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cases that do not involve the impairment of state financial obligations. 
The Court’s rationale for this limitation on the reserved powers 
doctrine is that applying the doctrine to the government’s financial 
obligations would compromise the public sector’s ability to obtain the 
credit that it needs to operate.167 For example, in United States Trust 
Company of New York v. New Jersey, the Court held that the statutory 
repeal of a covenant that limited subsidies for rail passenger 
transportation was unconstitutional and not justified by the reserved 
powers doctrine.168 In forming this conclusion, the Court noted that 
“states are bound by their debt contracts.”169 Since the case involved a 
state obligation that was “purely financial,” the covenant did not “fall 
within the reserved powers that cannot be contracted away.”170 
Despite this holding, the Court made clear that the “Contract Clause is 
not an absolute bar to subsequent modification of a State’s own 
financial obligations . . . an impairment may be constitutional if it is 
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”171 
B.  Applying the Reserved Powers Doctrine 
to Protect State Land Use Regulations 
The reserved powers doctrine is a powerful, yet unexplored, tool 
for protecting state land use regulations across the country. Oregon is 
not the only state where the regulation of land use has been threatened 
by fanatic property rights activists. Prior to Oregon’s Measure 37, 
four states—Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—already had 
government compensation requirements on the books.172 Subsequent 
to Measure 37’s enactment in 2004, property rights activists across 
the country attempted to convince citizens to adopt government 
compensation requirements in their own states. In 2006 alone, 
activists in six states—Montana, Missouri, California, Washington, 
Idaho, and Oklahoma—attempted to require their governments to 
provide monetary compensation for applicable land use regulations 
 
167 Id. at 130–31 (interpreting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 883–884 
(1996)). 
168 U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 32. 
169 Id. at 24. 
170 Id. at 24–25. 
171 Id. at 25. 
172 See generally Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 18. Interestingly, all of these 
laws were enacted in 1995. Id. at 447, 516, 518. 
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with citizen-petitioned initiatives.173 Most of these initiatives 
contained an express regulatory waiver provision, and many were 
interpreted to allow governments to waive the offending land use laws 
to avoid paying an insurmountable sum of money to affected 
landowners.174 In the event that government entities choose to modify 
or void binding waivers issued pursuant to initiatives that survived the 
voting process, government entities should invoke the reserved 
powers doctrine to protect their decisions, and ultimately, their state 
land use laws. 
It is clear that the reserved powers doctrine precludes interpreting 
regulatory waivers granted pursuant to Measure 37, or any other 
government compensation requirement, as irrevocable contracts. As 
seen above, the reserved powers doctrine is a standard exception to 
the Contract Clause that protects a state’s ability to modify or 
withdraw from contracts that interfere with essential attributes of 
sovereign power. One attribute of sovereign power that the doctrine 
protects is the exercise of state police powers to protect important 
public interests. A state’s ability to withdrawal from contracts such as 
regulatory waivers, and to pass legislation such as Measure 49, is 
essential to its exercise of sovereign power: 
[T]here could be no contract and no irrepealable law upon 
government subjects . . . every succeeding legislature possesses the 
same jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that the latter have 
the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of 
enactment, -neither more nor less; that all occupy in this respect a 
footing of perfect equality; that this is necessarily so, in the nature 
of things; that it is vital to the public welfare that each one should 
be able to, at all times, to do whatever the varying circumstances 
and present exigencies attending the subject may require; and that a 
different result would be fraught with evil.175 
States with government compensation requirements must be able to 
protect the public interest by retaining the power to modify or rescind 
regulatory waivers. This control over binding state commitments is 
essential to avoid repeating Oregon’s frantic struggle to protect 
natural resources from unruly development during the three years that 
Measure 37 was in effect. 
 
173 Whipple, supra note 18. Out of the six states with Measure 37-like initiatives on the 
2006 ballot, Arizona was the only state to actually adopt a pay or waive scheme. 
Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 18, at 521. 
174 See generally Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 18. 
175 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added). 
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In the event that courts in states other than Oregon interpret 
regulatory waivers to be binding contracts, the case law surrounding 
the reserved powers doctrine supports the conclusion that regulatory 
waivers are revocable. The reserved powers doctrine renders such 
waivers revocable because a state’s contractual obligations under 
regulatory waivers are not “purely financial.” For example, if 
Oregon’s obligations were purely financial, United States Trust 
Company of New York v. New Jersey would have precluded the 
application of the reserved powers doctrine.176 It is true that the 
Measure 37 waivers obligated the state to waive land use regulations 
that restricted development on claimants’ properties as a form of just 
compensation. However, the state also had an obligation to 
Oregonians who did not obtain Measure 37 waivers—an obligation to 
protect the public welfare. Even if a court interpreted the Measure 37 
waivers to be purely of a financial nature, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the “Contract Clause is not an absolute bar to 
subsequent modification of a State’s own financial obligations . . . . 
[A]n impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose.”177 The state must 
“continue[] to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its 
people” at all costs.178 If other courts interpret regulatory waivers as 
binding contracts, the contractual impairments caused by subsequent 
government decisions, legislation, or initiatives would certainly be 
reasonable and necessary to serve the important public purpose of 
safeguarding a state’s land use system, outshining the government’s 
financial obligations. 
Moreover, the enactment of subsequent legislation such as Measure 
49 to limit the scope of compensation requirements is a valid exercise 
of a state’s police power because such actions are necessary to protect 
the public welfare. As noted by Professor Grant, “the [reserved 
powers] doctrine applies only to . . . exercises of the police power that 
affect public matters reaching some threshold of importance to the 
best interests of society.”179 States enjoy broad authority to legislate 
pursuant to their police powers—they are free to act to promote the 
 
176 U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 24–25. 
177 Id. at 25. 
178 Id. at 15 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 435 
(1934)). 
179 Grant, supra note 114, at 132 (summarizing the general principles articulated by 
cases that apply the reserved powers doctrine). 
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public welfare180 and to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and 
safety of the public.181 The regulation of private land use in order to 
protect natural resources is included in the long list of valid exercises 
of state police powers.182 As stated by Justice Brennan in his dissent 
to Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, “[t]here can be no 
dispute that the police power of the States encompasses the authority 
to impose conditions on private development.”183 The scope of land 
use regulations permitted under a state’s police power are extensive, 
ranging from scenic and residential zoning to landmark 
preservation.184 Therefore, this broad power to regulate land use 
surely includes the right to enact legislation such as Measure 49 that 
reasonably limits the amount of development that can occur on 
private properties located within sensitive rural areas that are rich in 
natural resources. 
In Oregon’s case, Measure 37 had a considerable negative effect on 
the state’s land use system. The development permitted by Measure 
37 waivers threatened to deplete the valuable farm and forest lands 
that the state had fought so hard to protect over the past three decades. 
The Oregon legislature had no choice but to enact Measure 49 to 
protect the natural resources that Oregonians depend on for their 
 
180 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 472 (1987) (“The 
Contracts Clause has not been read literally to obliterate valid exercises of the States’ 
police power to protect the public health and welfare.”); Minn. Ass’n of Health Care 
Facilities, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 451 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). 
181 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) (“It is the settled 
law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does 
not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of 
the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public . . . . This power, 
which, in its various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the 
sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general 
welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.” 
(quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905))). 
182 See Manigault, 199 U.S. at 481–83 (holding that a state’s action to build a dam, in 
spite of a prior private contract between landowners not to build, was a proper exercise of 
the state’s police power because private interests were subservient to the state’s power to 
provide for the general welfare and reclamation of the land and surrounding environment). 
183 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 (1987) (citing, as examples, 
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927)). 
184 Id. at 834–835 (J. Scalia majority opinion) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 
260–62; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. at 127; Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Laitos & Westfall, Government Interference with Private 
Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 66 (1987)). 
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livelihood and survival. The legislative findings that accompany 
Measure 49 prove that this was the state’s mindset: “The purpose of 
[Measure 49] is to modify Ballot Measure 37 (2004) to ensure that 
Oregon law provides just compensation for unfair burdens while 
retaining Oregon’s protections for farm and forest uses and the state’s 
water resources.”185 Accordingly, the history of the Contract Clause 
and the reserved powers doctrine provide states with a viable means 
of protecting themselves from harmful government compensation 
requirements in the event that they face endless regulatory waivers of 
their own. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Citizen-led initiatives to protect private property by requiring 
government entities to compensate landowners for burdensome land 
use regulations are here to stay. In the event that courts are confronted 
with cases similar to Citizens for Constitutional Fairness v. Jackson 
County in the future, the reserved powers doctrine should be invoked 
to ensure protection of valuable state land use regulations. Under the 
theory presented in this Article, the reserved powers doctrine provides 
a court with authority to interpret regulatory waivers issued in lieu of 
government compensation as revocable contracts. This interpretation 
will allow states to maintain their essential sovereign power to pass 
regulations in the name of the public interest that put a cap on 
unrestrained—and ultimately extremely harmful—development of 
natural resources and rural lands. 
 
 
185 Measure 49 § 3 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 195.301(2) (2007)). 
